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Many filmmakers have chosen what they would call a “faithful” approach to adap­
tation, in which the plot and characters are extracted and utilized as the basis of the 
action represented in the film. The resulting adaptations have catapulted classic 
narratives (usually novels or plays) into a more lucrative medium, thereby exploit­
ing the text as a template or stencil and reducing the adapter to a mere copier of plot. 
What the adapter borrows is essentially the narrative, which, as Seymour Chatman 
points out, lends itself most easily to such borrowing. Chatman writes:
One of the most important observations to come out of narratology is that narra­
tive itself is a deep structure quite independent of its medium. In other words, 
narrative is basically a kind of text organization, and that organization, that schema, 
needs to be actualized___A salient property of narrative is double time structur­
ing. That is, all narratives, in whatever medium, combine the time sequence of plot 
events, the time of the histoire (“story-time”) with the time of the presentation of 
those events in the text, which we call “discourse-time.” What is fundamental to 
narrative, regardless of medium, is that these two time orders are independent. . .  
Narratologists immediately observed an important consequence of this property 
of narrative texts, namely, the translatability of a given narrative from one medium 
to another. (435-436)
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It is precisely the ease of this transition from one medium to another that presents 
a problem: if adaptation is to acquire the status of “art,” it should not be easy. 
Christian Metz seems to view narrative as the greatest threat to one of the cinema’s 
most important distinguishing features: its lack of a rule-based grammatical system. 
Unlike the fixed grammatical system which is required in order to make meaning in 
writing, film’s relatively fluid system allows for the development of personal gram­
mars on the part of filmmakers, which emancipates them from inevitably speaking 
through pre-established codes. Metz suggests that narrative’s property of easy 
translatability undermines this liberating feature of film:
Many people, misled by a kind of reverse anticipation, have antedated the lan­
guage system; they believed they could understand [a] film because of its syntax, 
whereas one understands the syntax because one has understood, and only be­
cause one has understood, the film. The inherent intelligibility of a dissolve or a 
double exposure cannot clarify the plot of a film unless the spectator has already 
seen other films in which dissolves and double exposures were used intelligibly.
On the other hand, the narrative force of a plot, which will always be understood 
only too well—since it communicates with us in images of the world and of 
ourselves—will automatically lead us to understand the double exposure and the 
dissolve. (41)
Before examining Metz’s position on narrative, it is necessary to clarify his asser­
tion that the grammatical systems of literature and film are at odds. Metz refutes 
earlier structuralist arguments that the film shot is equivalent to a word by pointing 
out that “the shot [the smallest filmic unit] . . .  is closer . . .  to a sentence [or 
paragraph] than to a word. An image shows a man walking down a street: It is 
equivalent to the sentence ‘A man is walking down the street’ . . .  [not] to the word 
‘man,’ or the word ‘walk,’ or the word ‘street’” (67). If shots are equivalent at least 
to sentences, sometimes even to paragraphs, and if montage is a structuring prin­
ciple to be determined by the editor, then film certainly has no pre-determined 
grammar.1 Metz intimates, however, that a fixed cinematic grammatical system is in 
the process of being developed as more and more films are being made and seen. 
Principles of filming and editing are being taught in film classes as a kind of func­
tional grammar. These, however, are conventions, not rules.
It is narrative that introduces rules— and this is the reason Metz sees the 
“narrative force of plot” as the greatest threat to personal cinematic systems. It is 
the plot, Metz says, which allows for the automatic understanding of visual tech­
niques such as the double exposure and the dissolve. Yet Metz’s use of the word 
“understanding” implies that the construction of narrative lies just as much in the 
reception of the film as in its making. Readers and spectators are implicated along 
with creators in the problem of narrative construction. This suggests that an alter­
native approach to the use of narrative in adaptations could avoid mere utilitarian 
borrowing of story lines and could encourage the viewer to look for more than just 
narrative significance in the visual elements of the film— that is, to see the images 
as carrying a complex range of significations, rather than as subordinate handmaidens 
of plot. This approach would deal with narrative in creative ways— following the
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example of Mickey Madoda Dube who, in his adaptation Nagstappie, transforms 
the ending of fellow South African Alex La Guma’s A Walk in the Night and shifts 
the novel from an anti-apartheid to a post-apartheid work. Similarly, Dani Kouyate’s 
Keita is creative in its transposition of the Malian oral tale, the Sundjata Epic, into 
a late-twentieth century context. Such adaptations provided me with models for my 
own film adaptation, Perfect Darkness, which reevaluates Olive Schreiner’s novel, 
The Story o f  an African Farm , set in colonial times, through the lens of 
postcolonialism. As will become evident in this paper, I have drawn significantly on 
my practical experience of making Perfect Darkness in order to arrive at the taxo­
nomic categories of “pro-creational” and “appropriational.” In such a way, I at­
tempt to stress the importance of avoiding theorizing that is alienated from practical 
experience, and similarly practice that is alienated from theoretical concerns.
The problem of narrative itself has been addressed by many writers and film­
makers, such as filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard, who in the sixties developed a counter­
cinema in opposition to Hollywood (Wollen). Rather than take a stance in that 
debate, however, this paper critiques a particular use of narrative on the part of the 
film adapter, one that involves simply borrowing plot and characters, and which 
corresponds with a mode of adaptation that I call appropriation. In opposition to 
this appropriational mode, I distinguish an interpretive mode, although I recognize 
that separating the full range of adaptations into two neat polar categories is inad­
equate. These two categories are inevitably and inextricably linked, and aspects of 
the one mode will always accompany an attempted translation in the other mode. 
For example, an appropriational film adaptation shares certain properties with inter­
pretive film adaptation (such as the interpretive approach required by casting deci­
sions or how to visualize a particular passage), albeit usually owing to the require­
ments of transforming a verbal medium into a visual medium. On the other hand, the 
interpretive film adapter must consider questions of plot amidst methodological 
concerns (particularly if she is adapting a text with a strongly developed narrative). 
After all, since narrative is the most easily translatable of a text’s traits, it is also the 
most easily recognizable— if an adaptation strays too far from a text’s narrative, it 
risks losing its claim even to being called an adaptation of that text.
E. H. Gombrich defines the “minimum image” of an art work as being constituted 
by those elements that allow us to recognize it as a representation, translation, or 
adaptation of something else (5). Goran Sorbom, too, points us to the necessity of 
a degree of “subject-matter realism” for recognition of an imitation or adaptation. 
He writes: “When a portrait is made the qualities of the portrait are decided, to some 
degree at least, by the actual look of the given model if there is going to be a portrait 
at all” (24-25). In such a way, Gombrich and Sorbom draw our attention to the 
necessity of some form of narrative fidelity in film adaptation. While appropriational 
adaptation is characterized by fidelity to story alone, interpretive adaptation is 
characterized by fidelity to more than story. Interpretive adaptation involves reading 
the complex range of meaning-making strategies in the written text and rendering 
this in the medium of film. In trying to clarify this process, I will explore a range of 
terms proposed by theorists from various disciplines and periods, and will shape 
my own theory of and term for interpretive adaptation. I will then explain briefly
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why I classify my own adaptation, Perfect Darkness, as interpretive.
In transferring meanings from one language, medium, or context to another, the 
term that first comes to mind is translation. Roman Jakobson, working in the field of 
linguistics, divides translation into three categories: intralingual translation (trans­
lation within the same verbal language), interlingual translation (translation from 
one verbal language to another), and intersemiotic translation or transmutation 
(translation from a verbal language to a nonverbal language) (429). Interpretive 
adaptation falls into the third category, which Jakobson describes as the “interpre­
tation of verbal signs by means of nonverbal sign systems” (429). In his appellation 
for this category, “intersemiotic translation or transmutation,” Jakobson uses two 
tropes interchangeably, thereby opening up rather than refining the boundaries of 
interpretive adaptation; moreover, he makes no distinction between film and other 
kinds of “nonverbal sign systems.”
Barbara Johnson, from her perspective as literary and cultural theorist, does, 
however, make translation seem appealing as a trope for interpretive adaptation. 
She does this through her discussion of the translatory act in relation to issues of 
fidelity: by embarking on the process of translation, she argues, one discovers that 
in fact no “original” exists, and thus she requires one to reevaluate the question so 
often posed in relation to translation: is it faithful? Johnson writes:
In studying the differance of signification, Derrida follows the misfires, losses, and 
infelicities that prevent any language from being one. Language, in fact, can only 
exist in the space of its own foreignness to itself . . . .  For it is necessary to be 
faithful to the violent love-hate relation between letter and spirit, which is already 
a problem of translation within the original text. If the original text is already a 
translatory battle in which what is being translated is ultimately the very impos­
sibility of translation, then peacemaking gestures such as scrupulous adherence to 
the signifier are just as unfaithful to the energy of the conflict as the tyranny of the 
swell-footed signified. The translator must fight just as hard against the desire to 
be innocent as against what we today consider the guilty desire to master the text’s 
message. (146-147)
Johnson hereby condones infidelity to the “original” (whatever that may be—  
thought or text), but encourages fidelity to the “violent love-hate relation between 
letter and spirit.” In such a way, she encourages one to draw the analogy between 
the interpretive process which occurs in the filmmaker’s translation of text to film 
and that which occurs in the writer’s translation of spirit to text (what Johnson calls 
a “translatory battle”). This is not to relegate “spirit” to some shadowy, whimsical 
realm of uninscribable sentiment— it only serves to recognize the infidelity inherent 
even within the “original.” Thus, when a film adapter acts on the belief that she 
cannot be faithful to the letter of the text, she in fact re-stages the very infidelity that 
occurred in the production of the “original.” Sally Potter, film adapter of Virginia 
Woolf’s Orlando, alludes to this infidelity/fidelity dichotomy: “[T]he deeper I went 
[into writing the script], the more I realized I would have to be prepared to make 
changes [infidelity to letter] ... in order to stay true to what I loved in the book 
[fidelity to spirit]” (ix). Thus, adapters cannot dispense with the notion of fidelity
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altogether; the concern is rather about what it is one should be faithful to— or, 
which aspects of the text could be said to embody its “spirit.”
If “spirit” is seen as the expression of the writer’s desire, the expression of the 
writer’s self in oblique and ambiguous ways, then it can surely only be embodied by 
the text in its entirety— the story and the narration, the characters, the metaphors 
and symbols and allusions, the genre or genres that have been employed, and the 
thematic issues which the reader sees as linking all of these. While a novel’s 
“letter” could be said to refer to its narrative alone, “spirit” can be seen as incorpo­
rating the novel’s “letter” along with its other meaning-making strategies. The 
adapter interested in a novel’s “spirit”— not simply its “letter”— has to make choices 
that are similar to those made by the translator. These choices constitute an act of 
interpretation or criticism, as J. M. Coetzee points out:
[I]t is in the nature of the literary work to present its translator with problems for 
which the perfect solution is impossible and for which partial solutions constitute 
critical acts. A literary work is, among other things, a structure in which form has 
become meaning. When form is disrupted, meaning is also disrupted. Such disrup­
tion is inevitable, for there is never enough closeness of fit between languages for 
formal features of a work to be mapped across from one language to another 
without shifts of value. Thus the work continually presents its translator with 
moments of choice. (“Achterberg’s ‘Ballade van de gasfitter’” 88)
Mapping across from one medium to another similarly requires shifts of value. My 
film adaptation, Perfect Darkness, is interpretive in this sense, and the way in which 
it represents certain features— such as the mixing of sub-genres within The Story o f 
an African Farm and its questioning of conventional gender roles— foregrounds 
this act of interpretation. Kamilla Lee Denman has theorized the process of adapta­
tion in the same way, using the term “performative criticism” and defining it as 
follows:
The film adaptation is a fictional response to the novel on which it is based. 
Performative criticism in any mode—oral, visual, theatrical, musical, balletic, or 
filmic—provides a multi-faceted fictional response to a work of fiction that is not 
only an aesthetic production but a work of interpretation with layers that can be 
sensorily, emotionally, psychologically, and intellectually apprehended. Just as 
reading a poem or novel aloud, casting, directing, performing, or watching a play, 
or setting a piece of text to music can reveal hitherto hidden aspects of a literary 
work, so too, the film adaptation opens issues for analysis that might not be 
noticed through other methodologies, (iii)
Denman’s notion of “performative criticism”— that is, a piece of fiction in any 
medium that interprets a previous piece of fiction in any medium— challenges the 
assumption that critical discourse can be conceived in non-fictional, verbal lan­
guage only. Denman’s insights suggest that the cinema is not simply a medium for 
art or entertainment; it can also be an appropriate medium for critical discourse.
Film adaptation, owing to the opportunity it provides for the interpretation of 
a pre-existing text, is able to claim the status of “performative criticism,” or criticism
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articulated as a fictional response. Moreover, film adaptation disrupts the hierarchi­
cal system in which the verbal predominates over the visual, a power imbalance that 
has only recently been challenged. As Denman points out:
A competitive binary has dominated both critical and lay discussions of adapta­
tion. As film critic, historian, and theorist David Bordwell has pointed out, Roland 
Barthes’s application of semiology to non-linguistic signs implicitly makes lan­
guage the master system. Even the fact that current academic conventions compel 
me to write about literature and film affirms this master system, (ii)
Film adaptation, rather than lamenting the extent of power granted to language, 
challenges the notion of a linguistic master system by providing criticism in a 
performative mode. Moreover, performative criticism avoids some of the pitfalls of 
conventional critical discourse. The first of these pitfalls has been alluded to by 
Johnson as “the guilty desire to master the text’s message.” In this way she alludes 
to the assumption, usually operative in literary criticism, that the critic can expose 
the truth of the literary text. This is accompanied by an assumption that criticism 
itself does not express the critic’s own desire— which in turn should be open to 
interpretation. In the same vein, Coetzee has asked the question: “If the desire of 
literary criticism is to tell every truth, to unveil whatever is veiled, to expose every 
secret to sight, why does it not tell its own secrets? Or does it claim to have none?” 
(“Truth in Autobiography” 3).
Oscar Wilde was perhaps one of the first artist-critics to recognize that criti­
cism is inevitably a creative act, that it is not objective but subjective. Wilde writes:
The critic occupies the same relation to the work of art that he criticizes as the 
artist does to the visible world of form and color, or the unseen world of passion 
and of thought. . . .  [Criticism] works with materials, and puts them into a form 
that is at once new and delightful. What more can one say of poetry? Indeed, I
would call criticism a creation within a creation__ [T]he highest criticism really
is, the record of one’s own soul. It is more fascinating than history, as it is 
concerned simply with oneself. It is more delightful than philosophy, as its 
subject is concrete and not abstract, real and not vague. It is the only civilized form 
of autobiography, as it deals not with the events, but with the thoughts of one’s 
life, not with life’s physical accidents of deed or circumstance, but with the 
spiritual moods and imaginative passions of the mind. (1623)
Writing more than a century ago, Wilde presents us with an argument against 
conventional criticism and its claim to transparency: critical discourse, he sug­
gests, constructs a self on the part of the writer as much as fiction does. Even in the 
simple act of choosing a particular passage of a poem on which to comment, a critic 
is presenting for us an aperture to her personality. Through this choice, the critic 
reveals what moves her, what attracts her, what resonates within her, and ultimately 
what inspires her to respond to what she has read.
Since Wilde’s metaphor for criticism as a “creation within a creation” refers 
particularly to verbal criticism, it is necessary to distinguish the critical discourse 
made available to us by cinematic criticism. I make that distinction here by means of
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a new term that presides over and names the combination of fiction and criticism in 
interpretive adaptations. The term is “pro-creation,” a union of production and 
creation, as opposed to re-production and re-creation. Pro-creation focuses on the 
collaboration rather than competition between the text and the adapter; it refers to 
a dialogue mediated by the screen separating the two media, verbal and visual. It 
envisions the artist-critic’s creative stance as a kind of Kandinskyian two-sided 
mirror, constantly rotating, with the text on one side, and the filmmaker, the pro- 
creative agent, on the other. Or, better yet, as the two-sided mirror displayed at the 
Boston Science Museum, where two reflections are merged into one image on the 
mediating screen of a mirror.2 In addition it suggests an interface— an amalgam of 
two faces projected into a new domain— instead of merely a surface. “Pro-creation” 
thus intimates that interpretive adaptations are comparable to offspring: they con­
tain a gene-ric mixture constituted from both the text and adapter rather than merely 
being genetically derivative of the original text (as appropriations tend to be). One 
might argue that “re-production” is synonymous to “pro-creation,” but pro-cre­
ation seems more appropriate, since it foregrounds the aspects of creative produc­
tion and does not carry with it the connotations of derivativeness. The definitions 
in Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary' make this distinction clear:
Procreation: 1. The act of begetting or generating (offspring).
2. The act of producing; bringing into being.
Reproduction: 1. The act or process of reproducing.
2. The state of being reproduced.
3. Something made by reproducing an original; copy; du­
plicate.
4. The natural process among organisms by which new 
individuals are generated and the species perpetuated.
The hyphenated “pro-creation” indicates that it is a composite of “production” and 
“creation” rather than simply “procreation.” It is significant in this respect that 
Schreiner uses the idea of gestation and birth—the components of procreation— 
as extended metaphors for the artistic process. In her dedication at the beginning of 
The Story o f an African Farm , Schreiner— under the pseudonym of Ralph Iron— 
calls her book “this little firstling of my pen” (25). Yet in the novel she unsettles 
conventional gender roles by presenting, for example, Waldo’s sheep-shearing 
invention and his wood carving each as the result of a nine-month gestation period. 
In this way she shows her feminist impulse to be inclusive rather than exclusive.
In a similar way, through the term “pro-creation,” I mean to avoid creating an 
essentialist metaphor, which would suggest that only women are capable of giving 
birth to adaptations. Rather, it emphasizes the regenerative quality of adaptation. 
Schreiner herself seems to condone the regeneration— or pro-creation— of her text 
with the following words:
The whole of the story is not written here, but it is suggested. And the attribute of 
all true art, the highest and the lowest, is this—that it says more than it says, and
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takes you away from itself. It is a little door that opens into an infinite hall where 
you may find what you please . . . .  We see what we see, but nothing more. (169)
Interestingly, Schreiner’s words— in her work of fiction— are almost identical to 
those of Wilde— in his work of criticism. Wilde writes:
To the critic the work of art is simply a suggestion for a new work of his own, that 
need not necessarily bear any obvious resemblance to the thing it criticizes. The 
one characteristic of a beautiful form is that one can put into it whatever one 
wishes, and see in it whatever one chooses to see; and the Beauty, that gives to 
creation its universal and aesthetic element, makes the critic a creator in his turn, 
and whispers of a thousand different things which were not present in the mind of 
him who carved the statue or painted the panel or graved the gem . . . .  You see, 
then, how it is that the aesthetic critic rejects these obvious modes of art that have 
but one message to deliver, and having delivered it become dumb and sterile, and 
seeks rather for such modes as suggest reverie and mood, and by their imaginative 
beauty make all interpretations true, and no interpretation final. Some resem­
blance, no doubt, the creative work of the critic will have to the work that has 
stirred him to creation, but it will be such resemblance as exists, not between 
Nature and the mirror that the painter of landscape or figure may be supposed to 
hold up to her, but between Nature and the work of the decorative artist. (1626- 
1627)
Working in the twenty-first century, with the wealth of insights provided by the 
theorists of the twentieth century, one would perhaps not want to go so far as to 
claim that the critic or filmmaker can find whatever she pleases or see whatever she 
wishes: one has to recognize that the act of interpretation is circumscribed by the 
discourses currently in circulation. Schreiner and Wilde nevertheless seem to an­
ticipate the way in which poststructuralism questions the notion of origins (as 
Johnson does above) and sees meaning as continuously deferred and always 
dependent upon further acts of interpretation.
This continuous deferral of meaning is also characteristic of allegory, as it has 
been defined by Paul de Man. De Man points out that the meaning of an allegorical 
sign consists “only in the repetition . . .  of a previous sign with which it can never 
coincide” and that it “exists entirely within an ideal time that is never here and now 
but always a past or an endless future” (“The Rhetoric of Temporality” 190-191, 
207). He uses Charles Sanders Peirce’s analysis of the way in which the linguistic 
sign has to be interpreted as a model for his own definition of irony:
Charles Sanders Peirce, who, with Nietzsche and Saussure, laid the philosophical 
foundation for modem semiology, stressed the distinction between grammar and 
rhetoric in his celebrated and so suggestively unfathomable definition of the sign.
He insists, as is well known, on the necessary presence of a third element, called 
the interpretant, within any relationship that the sign entertains with its object.
The sign is to be interpreted if we are to understand the idea it is to convey, and 
this is so because the sign is not the thing but a meaning derived from the thing by 
a process here called representation that is not simply generative, i.e., dependent 
on a uni vocal origin. The interpretation of the sign is not, for Peirce, a meaning but
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another sign; it is a reading, not a decodage, and this reading has, in its turn, to be 
interpreted into another sign, and so on ad inifinitunu Peirce calls this process by 
means of which “one sign gives birth to another” pure rhetoric, as distinguished 
from pure grammar, which postulates the possibility of unproblematic, dyadic 
meaning, and pure logic, which postulates the possibility of the universal truth of 
meanings. {Allegories of Reading 9)
The allegorical work is in the same relationship to the past text as is the sign in 
relation to the object: both are meanings that require interpretation. This interpreta­
tion, however, is not a definitive meaning, but anticipates yet further interpretation.
The allegorical nature of The Story o f an African Farm has been the focus of 
commentary by several critics, amongst whom is Patricia Murphy. Although 
Murphy’s definition of allegory may be accused of articulating an essentialist view 
of the feminine, it is useful for an understanding of allegory’s regenerative nature:
Allegory resonates with feminine temporality through the sense of infinity that 
this emblematic narrative form imparts, since an allegory both enlarges one text to 
create others and represents a form of eternalizing ar t . . .  . In Roland Barthes’s 
term, the text becomes a “galaxy of signifiers” instead of “a structure of signifieds.”
(90)
Lengthy passages of writing in a traditional allegorical mode are to be found in 
Schreiner’s novel, but my concern here is with the allegorical nature of Perfect 
Darkness (and its models) as pro-creative adaptation. As an adaptation of Schreiner’s 
novel, the film constitutes a repetition of a past text— of one of the texts of a 
particular literary tradition. At the same time, in foregrounding its interpretive (rather 
than appropriational) relationship to The Story o f an African Farm , and also its 
fictional status, the film invites further interpretations of its own visual and audi­
tory imagery.
According to Craig Owens, “in allegorical structure. . .  one text is read through 
another, however fragmentary, intermittent, or chaotic their relationship may be; the 
paradigm for the allegorical work is thus the palimpsest” (69). My film is to be read 
through the novel, and the novel read through the film— as I have already sug­
gested in the image of the two-sided mirror. Projecting this interface into a new 
domain, the film opens itself up to interpretation, rather than claiming a union with 
the novel that would close off other meanings. The allegorical work of art thus 
admits to its inevitable status as an unfinished work of art. It is perhaps for this 
reason that allegory, according to Owens, “is consistently attracted to the fragmen­
tary, the imperfect, the incomplete” (70).
The difference, or distance, inherent in allegory is intended to emerge particu­
larly through Perfect Darkness's reevaluation of the novel, set in colonial times, 
through a postcolonial lens. South Africa in Schreiner’s time was of course vastly 
different from contemporary South Africa, and Perfect Darkness attempts to fore­
ground this difference. The novel loosely centers itself around Lyndall, a white girl 
growing up in the 1850s in colonial South Africa. It moves from her childhood on a 
Karroo farm as an abused orphan, to her return from girls’ boarding-school, to her
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escape with the stranger mysteriously named “R. R.” to the Transvaal, to her lonely, 
premature death (figured as a sleep-wish) soon after the death of her three-hour-old 
child (watched over by her transvestite nurse, Gregory Rose). Perfect Darkness 
transforms the third part of Lyndall’s story (from her escape to the Transvaal until 
her death) into a possible postcolonial equivalent. Jessica— the film’s Lyndall 
figure— has emigrated from South Africa to America five years previous to the 
film's diegesis; the film traces her developing narcolepsy (a kind of “death in sleep”) 
in America and her strikingly beautiful dreams of South Africa. The only people 
with whom Jessica has contact are two psychoanalysts, Rose and Gregory (Gre­
gory Rose split into two characters— a white woman and a black man), and the 
father of her dead child, David (the film’s R. R. equivalent), none of whom can fully 
understand the essence of her illness.
Perfect Darkness thus not only attempts to preserve the pattern of the novel’s 
narrative, but also to reevaluate it through a postcolonial lens in order to highlight 
what has changed as well as what has not changed in the South African situation. 
Lyndall and Jessica both flee from their original homes to new places to get “out of 
the world” (239). In such a way, Perfect Darkness equates Schreiner’s African farm 
with South Africa in general, and Schreiner’s Transvaal with America (as a symbolic 
destination of South African emigration). This is in accordance with Coetzee’s 
reading of the African farm as Schreiner’s allegory of colonial South Africa (White 
Writing 66). Yet it is also an attempt to foreground my own act of producing 
criticism-as-creation. I chose to adapt The Story o f an African Farm because I 
identified not only with what Schreiner was expressing in the text, but also with the 
context of the novel’s production— an identification that has important creative 
bearing on Perfect Darkness. As a twenty-one-year-old white woman at the time of 
making the film (Schreiner was twenty-one when she wrote the novel) attempting to 
communicate artistically in a foreign context, I found it almost as difficult to antici­
pate an audience as did Schreiner a century ago. Thus, the film attempts an allegori­
cal response not only to the novel’s content, but also to its context of production 
and other aspects of its “spirit.”
The pro-creational adaptation, then, foregrounds the way in which the film 
constructs a self for and expresses the desire of the adapter; it is, like Wilde’s form 
of criticism, a form of autobiography. It does not deny these functions of criticism, 
as conventional critical discourse frequently does, but celebrates them. The pro- 
creational adaptation claims a kind of freedom for itself, but does not assume domi­
nance over the text. It thus works in an antithetical way not only to conventional 
critical discourse but also to appropriational adaptation. Appropriational adapta­
tion could be said to undermine the power of both text and film, as each seems to 
abrogate the expressive force of the other: in borrowing only the narrative from the 
text, the appropriational adapter submits to reproducing faithfully this aspect of the 
novel, but at the same time limits the range of meanings that the novel potentially 
offers. Pro-creational adaptation, on the other hand, in its fidelity to the novel’s 
“spirit”— that is, to the novel’s narrative as well as to its other modes of significa­
tion— brings to life a multiplicity of meanings, turning the text into a “galaxy of 
signifiers,” empowering both novel and adaptation at the same time.
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Notes
1 Indeed, the equivalence is so conditional that it hardly seems viable to use the very 
word “grammar” to describe the internal structure of films. For the sake of clarity, however,
I shall continue to call it such.
2 Perfect Darkness includes a crucial scene at this mirror, where the faces of the 
protagonists, Jessica and David, become melded together.
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